Well, freedom to access the internet is a fundamental right and is described under The Indian constitution of Article 19(1)(a), i.e. (that is) freedom of speech and expression.
Therefore sling rules of suspension under suspension rules are subjected to judicial review; however, shutting down of internet in union territory is considered as illegal. With the notice of protection and misuse of the facilities, Apex court held that the power under section 144 of CRPC could not be used to quell legitimate expression of opinion or exercise of any democratic right and contend that magistrate while hold says power under section 144 was duty-bound to balance rights and restrictions on the principles of proportionality and apply the least invasive measure.
The government should respect the freedom of speech and expression and freedom to practice any profession or carry out any trade, business or occupation over the medium of internet enjoys constitutional protection under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(g). The restrictions on such fundamental rights should be in concord under Article 19(2) and (6) of the constitution. The right to access the internet is a salient feature of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
In the case of Centre for public interest litigation v union of India, the petition was filed with subject to disbursement of 50 acres of land in Kandla port, Gujarat which was allotted on lease to United Salt in 1974. United salt sold 1010 acres of land to the respondent Friends salt work & Allied Industries (FSWAI) for consideration of Rs22 lakh in spite of having no provision for selling lease rights for consideration.
The lease got renewed despite the fact that the original leaseholders had transferred leases without the consent of the central government. Petitioner despite the period of many leases being over, they continued to be in possession of leaseholders and union of India made no efforts to remove them.
Lease period of salt firms occupying land at Kandla port expired, the report was submitted on the land scam, and it was stated that it is considered under Prevention of Corruption Act and involved various offences like cheating, conspiracy and criminal misconduct. No actions were taken on the report, and no investigation was made. A writ of Mandamus was brought against the union of India directing to extract appropriate damages from trespassers on the government land. The court passed various orders inter- alia directing investigation. It was stated that the lease would be put to public auction after fixing the reserve price on the basis of the valuation report and proceedings for eviction have been initiated against the persons, who are in authorized occupation of the land area.
Whereas In the case of Hari Kumar Mandir Trust v state of Maharashtra, Petition was filed for the property which is the subject matter of the writ petition, belonging to one family, Mrs Krishnabai Gopalrao sold the property in favour of Swami Dilipkumar Roy and Mrs Indira Devi registered by a sale deed. The property later on transferred to the petitioner Trust. According to the petitioner, the property had been divided into four plots. The order of division was passed, and the owner was Pune Municipal Corporation with respect to an internal road which was part of the plot. The petitioner contends the letter; The Town Planning Department acknowledged and accepted the fact that the Pune Municipal Corporation has never acquired the inner road.
The Pune Municipal Corporation was wrongly shown, and the Pune Municipal Corporation did not hold the road. The notice was issued and published in the official gazette. The writ petition was filled up saying that since the Pune Municipal Corporation had expressly admitted that it was not the owner of the property. It was also denied, but the merit of section 88 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act is that since the term is not used, it cannot be said that full ownership was transferred to the planning authority. It was also argued that the road was not a public road.
Following the amendment of the writ petition, the petitioner had also submitted that the order passed by the defendant was passed without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard.
Another case referred under Indian Hotel Restaurant Association v state of Maharashtra, the writ petition was filed and section 33A of Bombay police act, 1951 was challenged before Bombay High court on the grounds prohibiting
The Bombay HC (High Court) held that Article 33A. Article 14 violates the right to equality and right to livelihood, and hence it is enshrined under the Indian Constitution.
The Maharashtra government filed an appeal before the SC and prayed that all the dances found under section 33A be read for Artha dances which are obscene and degrading to the dignity of women.
The SC (Supreme Court) upheld the decision of the Bombay High Court. It declared that Section 33A violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the ground that such a law is based on an acceptable presumption that a higher degree of decency, morality or strength of character is compared to its counterparts, which are characterized by facilities Is considered inferior to Quality in dance bars.
It was declared that Section 33A violates Article 19 (1) (g) on the grounds that it interfaces with the right of women to work. The court further urged that the government take positive steps to ensure safety and improve the working conditions of women.
Thus our fundamental rights are the main sources of our constitution which enable a person to access his rights and privileges. The same approach as the right to access to the internet is that all people can enjoy their freedom of expression and their right to an opinion and other fundamental rights and duties.
On August seven, 2020, chief minister Arvind Kejriwal launched 'Delhi Electrical Vehicle Policy' to waive the registration fee and road tax, and degreed to provide an incentive of up to Rs one.5 100000 for brand new cars within the town.
So far our Indian constitution is concerned it has never been a frozen document, neither at the time when it was framed.